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Abstract
This article examines the recent decision in Michigan v. EPA, in which the U.S. Supreme
Court held that the EPA acted unreasonably in not considering costs at the listing phase of the
regulation of power plants’ emissions under a specific provision of the Clear Air Act (CAA). In
Michigan, the Court interpreted the applicable statutory provision based on the principles of rational administrative decision-making, thereby establishing a connection between cost consideration
by administrative agencies and the principles of reasonable exercise of administrative discretion.
We contend that Michigan failed to properly appreciate the logical and axiological connection
between cost consideration and administrative rationality (i.e., the cost/rationality nexus). More
specifically, the Court failed to distinguish between two independent steps of cost consideration:
cost determination and cost quantification. Cost determination considers that one set of relevant
interests must be made a cost upon someone else, and decides how to allocate rights between
competing interests. This decision rests on political considerations and moral factors that are independent of the concept of cost. Cost quantification requires deliberating to what extent one set of
interests should be made a cost upon someone else. Unlike cost determination, cost quantification
is logically based on the concept of cost. Cost quantification assumes cost determination in order
to function. The failure to appreciate this distinction led to illogical reasoning by the Court and
to a decision that is inconsistent with Congress’ cost determination. This paper contributes to the
legal-economic literature on cost-benefit analysis (CBA) by outlining a functional dimension of
cost consideration by administrative agencies that is frequently overlooked in legal-economic literature. While CBA proponents often note that cost consideration provides agencies with a method
for promoting social welfare maximization, we emphasize that cost consideration enhances the
rationality of administrative action by ensuring a transparent and accountable definition of the set
of relevant interests that underpins the definition of costs and benefits.
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order to function. The failure to appreciate this distinction led to
illogical reasoning by the Court and to a decision that is inconsistent
with Congress’ cost determination. This paper contributes to the legaleconomic literature on cost-benefit analysis (CBA) by outlining a
functional dimension of cost consideration by administrative agencies
that is frequently overlooked in legal-economic literature. While CBA
proponents often note that cost consideration provides agencies with a
method for promoting social welfare maximization, we emphasize that
cost consideration enhances the rationality of administrative action by
ensuring a transparent and accountable definition of the set of relevant
interests that underpins the definition of costs and benefits.

Cost and therefore economizing is not a natural
phenomenon of the production function but, rather, an
institutional artifact.1

INTRODUCTION
In Michigan v. EPA,2 the Supreme Court of the United States held
that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) acted unreasonably
when it refused to consider costs in deciding whether it was
“appropriate and necessary” to regulate mercury emissions from
power plants under the Clean Air Act (CAA).3 The decision is
significant for two reasons. First, the Court established that an agency
that ignores costs acts arbitrarily, thus giving costs a more central role
1. A. Allen Schmid, All Environmental Policy Instruments Require a Moral
Choice as to Whose Interests Count, in ECONOMICS, ETHICS, AND ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY: CONTESTED CHOICES 133, 135 (Daniel W. Bromley & Jouni Paavola eds.,
2002).
2. Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015).
3. Id. at 2712. The CAA established a comprehensive set of regulatory programs
to control air pollution, including the National Emissions Standards for Hazardous
Air Pollutants (NESHAP). 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d). Coal- and oil-fired electric utility
steam generating units (i.e., power plants) fall within NESHAP’s scope. §
7412(n)(1).
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in judicial review of rational administrative action. Second, the Court
created a new default cost-benefit rule that applies when statutes are
silent or ambiguous—i.e., in the absence of an unambiguous statutory
prohibition to consider cost, courts must still assume that an agency
that ignores costs is acting arbitrarily. In taking these steps, the Court
expressly uses the concept of cost to articulate a canon of
administrative rationality.4 Cost consideration is an essential
component of “logical and rational” agency decision making.5
Agencies should take this principle account when interpreting
statutory provisions. However, Michigan leaves unanswered questions
concerning the relationship between cost and rationality. Therefore, it
is no surprise that the true impact of Michigan on the practice of cost
consideration remains the subject of considerable debate among legal
scholars and practitioners.6
4. In this article, we use rationality to refer to non-arbitrary/non-capricious
administrative behavior in the context of administrative law. The requirement of
rationality is rooted in section 706(2)(A) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),
which established that Courts must hold unlawful and set aside agency actions found
to be “arbitrary,” “capricious,” or “otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C.
§ 706(2)(A). We use the terms arbitrary and capricious standard of review and hard
look review interchangeably. For additional discussion regarding the arbitrary and
capricious standard of review, see Cass R. Sunstein, Deregulation and the HardLook Doctrine, 1983 SUP. CT. REV. 177 (1983); Lisa S. Bressman, Judicial Review
of Agency Discretion, in A GUIDE TO JUDICIAL AND POLITICAL REVIEW OF FEDERAL
AGENCIES 177 (John F. Duffy & Michael Herz eds., 2005); Richard J. Pierce, Jr.,
What Factors Can an Agency Consider in Making a Decision?, 2009 MICH. L. REV.
67 (2009); and Louis J. Virelli III, Deconstructing Arbitrary and Capricious Review,
92 N.C. L. REV. 721 (2014).
5. Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2706.
6. See, e.g., Andrew M. Grossman, Michigan v. EPA: A Mandate for Agencies
to Consider Costs, 2015 CATO SUPR. CT. REV. 281 (2014); Lindsay Ward, Michigan
v. Environmental Protection Agency, 6 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 1 (2015),
http://scholarship.law.umt.edu/plrlr/vol0/iss6/12/; Ruby Khallouf, Michigan v. EPA:
Money Matters When Deciding Whether to Regulate Power Plants, 27 VILL. ENVTL.
L. J. 275 (2016); Jonathan Masur & Eric A. Posner, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the
Judicial Role, 787 COASE-SANDOR WORKING PAPER SERIES IN L. AND ECON. (2016);
Lauren Packard, Note, Michigan: An Intrusive Inquiry into EPA’s Rulemaking
Process, 42 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 117 (2016); Connor Schratz, Note, Michigan v.
EPA and the Erosion of Chevron Deference, 68 ME. L. REV. 381 (2016); Cass R.
Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Arbitrariness Review, 41 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV.
1 (2017); Adrian Vermeule, Does Michigan v. EPA Require Cost-Benefit Analysis?,
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In this article, we examine the Supreme Court’s reasoning with
respect to the cost/rationality nexus. We do not provide a
comprehensive discussion of all the points related to the statutory
interpretative issues that were relevant in Michigan.7 We contend that
Michigan failed to properly appreciate the logical and axiological
connection between cost consideration and administrative rationality
(i.e., the cost/rationality nexus). More specifically, the Court failed to
distinguish between two logically independent steps of cost
consideration: cost determination and cost quantification.8 Cost
determination considers that one set of relevant interests must be made
a cost upon a competing set of interests, and decides how to allocate
rights between competing interests. Cost quantification requires
deliberating to what extent one set of interests should be made a cost
upon someone else. The phrase refers to cost-benefit balancing. It is
not limited to monetized cost-benefit analysis (CBA), but includes a
wide array of procedures and practices used by agencies to balance the
advantages and disadvantages of agency decisions. This broader
meaning allows us to focus on the functional dimension common to all
cost-benefit balancing techniques, which is assessing the degree of
sacrifice imposed on a given set of relevant interests relative to the
corresponding benefits accorded to another set of interests.
The lack of distinction between cost determination and cost
quantification led to illogical reasoning by the Court. Based on the
ruling in Michigan, it is evident that the cost/rationality nexus needs to
be re-examined; the rationality of administrative action will only be
YALE J. ON REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT (Feb. 6, 2017), http://yalejreg.com/nc/doesmichigan-v-epa-require-cost-benefit-analysis-by-adrian-vermeule/.
7. For a detailed discussion on this issue, see, for instance, supra note 3, and
references thereafter. See also Grossman, supra note 6; Ward, supra note 6; Packard,
supra note 6.
8. This theory builds on Nussbaum’s assertion: “[W]e may note that cost-benefit
analysis can actually help us when we are in doubt about where to set the threshold
of citizens’ basic entitlements. In environmental and regulatory areas, for example,
seeing the cost of various levels of protection is helpful when we consider exactly
what level of protection is a basic entitlement . . . . More generally, all rights have
costs, so thinking about where to set the threshold level of any right is sensibly done
with these costs in mind.” Martha Nussbaum, The Costs of Tragedy: Some Moral
Limits of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1005, 1035 (2000) (emphasis
added).

2017] MICHIGAN V. EPA: COST/RATIONALITY NEXUS CLARIFIED 129

improved once the distinction between cost quantification and cost
determination is fully appreciated. Without a clear definition of the
cost/rationality nexus, in light of the distinction between cost
determination and cost quantification, Michigan will likely introduce
more confusion to the regulatory process.
This paper contributes to the legal-economic literature on CBA by
focusing on a dimension of cost consideration by administrative
agencies that is often overlooked in legal-economic discourse. CBA
proponents often note that cost consideration provides agencies with a
method for promoting social welfare maximization. However, there is
a functional element of cost consideration that is distinct from, and
logically precedes, the maximization of social welfare: the definition
of the set of relevant interests. Cost consideration enhances the
rationality of administrative action by first ensuring a transparent and
accountable delineation of the set of relevant interests that underpins
the definition of costs and benefits. When an agency clearly identifies
whose interests are made a cost to whom, its regulatory actions are
considered transparent and accountable. When it is not clear “whose
interests count,” cost consideration has little influence on
administrative rationality. When careful attention is paid to the two
functional aspects of cost consideration, cost determination and cost
quantification, the consistency and transparency of regulatory action
can be improved.
By building on observations derived from three separate strands of
scholarship, we seek to explain the cost/rationality nexus. First,
concepts developed by law and economics scholars are used to identify
the institutional nature of costs, noting that the interests of some are
made costs to others through the assignment of legal rights.9 Cost is a
function of assigning rights; rights are not derived from costs. Second,
we build on economic literature that has critically examined the issue

9. See A. Allan Schmid, Law and Economics: An Institutional Perspective, in
LAW AND ECONOMICS 57 (Nicholas Mercuro ed., 1989); WARREN J. SAMUELS,
STEVEN J. MEDEMA & A. ALLAN SCHMID, THE ECONOMY AS A PROCESS OF
VALUATION (1997); STEVEN G. MEDEMA, NICHOLAS MERCURO & WARREN J.
SAMUELS, Institutional Law and Economics, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND
ECONOMICS: THE HISTORY AND METHODOLOGY OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 418
(Gerrit de Gees ed., 2000).
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of ‘standing’ in cost-benefit analysis.10 This literature has long
recognized that value assumptions underlie the decisions made
regarding whose preferences have standing. Welfare maximization can
be achieved through CBA only because judgments regarding whose
welfare should be factored into the social welfare calculus have been
made. For this reason, the issue of standing cannot be resolved on
technical grounds, but depends on value choices and ethical
considerations. Third, we draw on recent administrative law
scholarship that has emphasized the multifaceted nature of the
arbitrary review process11 and has recognized the role of political
considerations in hard look review.12 Arguably, these insights enable
courts to identify more targeted and specific forms of arbitrariness in
light of the proposed distinction between cost determination and cost
quantification, thereby better serving as juridical safeguards against
unrestrained agency behavior.
Taken together, these three strands of scholarship enable us to
illuminate the content of the cost/rationality nexus, to recognize the
logical relevance and juridical nature of the assumptions underpinning
cost consideration, and to deem an administrative action arbitrary if it
fails to comport with the set of statutorily defined relevant interests.
Ultimately, these insights provide a conceptual framework for
enhancing the transparency and consistency of legal-economic
reasoning in the context of regulatory action, based on the assumption

10. See Ezra J. Mishan, Pareto Optimality and the Law, 19 OXFORD ECON.
PAPERS 255 (1967); William M. Trumbull, Who Has Standing in Cost Benefit
Analysis?, 9 J. OF POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT 201 (1990); Richard O. Zerbe Jr.,
Comment: Does Benefit Cost Analysis Stand Alone? Rights and Standing, 10 J. OF
POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT 96 (1991); Richard O. Zerbe Jr., The Legal Foundation
of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 2 CHARLESTON L. REV. 93 (2007).
11. See Virelli, supra note 4.
12. See CHRISTOPHER F. EDLEY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: RETHINKING JUDICIAL
CONTROL OF BUREAUCRACY (1992); Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114
HARV. L. REV. 2245 (2001); T. J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The Real World of
Arbitrariness Review, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 761 (2008); Kathryn Watts, Proposing a
Place for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 119 YALE L. J. 2 (2009); Nina
A. Mendelson, Disclosing ‘Political’ Oversight of Agency Decision Making, 108
MICH. L. REV. 1127 (2010).
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that the legislative branch remains the actor whose will and legitimacy
should be considered in the political definition of the relevant interests.
This article is organized in four sections. Section 2 briefly examines
the Michigan decision by highlighting its two major contributions to
the practice of cost consideration: the cost/rationality nexus and the
new default cost-benefit rule. Section 3 develops a conceptual analysis
of the cost/rationality nexus. It examines the logical features of the
concept of cost, and articulates the distinction between cost
determination and cost quantification. Section 4 applies the proposed
conceptual framework to the central issue in Michigan. It shows that
the proposed institutional understanding of the cost/rationality
nexus—centered on the definition of the set of relevant interests and
the distinction between cost determination and cost quantification—
provides an alternative understanding of the relevant issue in Michigan
and identifies the inconclusiveness of arguments used by the Supreme
Court.
I. MICHIGAN’S IMPACT ON COST CONSIDERATION
The central issue in Michigan is whether the EPA unreasonably
refused to consider costs at the listing phase, when determining
whether the regulation of mercury emissions from power plants was
“appropriate and necessary” under §7412(n)(1)(A) of the CAA.13 The
EPA interpreted this statutory provision as not demanding cost
considerations in listing decisions, and so made the initial decision
accordingly, reserving the consideration of the cost of regulation until
13. The CAA created a multi-stage regulatory process that the EPA must follow.
In the listing phase, the EPA determines whether the sources of air pollutants present
a threat of adverse effects to human health or the environment, thus warranting
regulation:
“The Administrator shall perform a study of the hazards to public health
reasonably anticipated to occur as a result of emissions by electric utility
steam generating units of pollutants listed under subsection (b) after
imposition of the requirements of this Act . . . . The Administrator shall
regulate electric utility steam generating units under this section, if the
Administrator finds such regulation is appropriate and necessary after
considering the results of the study required by this subparagraph.”
42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)(A). At the standard-setting phase, the agency sets emission
standards that major sources must meet to achieve emission reductions.
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after it had determined the standards’ stringency.14 Petitioners
requested review of the EPA’s new rule, arguing that the proper scope
of “appropriate” would encompass consideration by the EPA of all
“relevant factors, including costs.”15 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia ruled for the EPA, holding that it was reasonable
for the agency to not consider costs at the listing phase and stating that
section 7412(n)(1)(A) neither requires nor prohibits the EPA from
considering costs.16 In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court held that the
“EPA interpreted §7412(n)(1)(A) unreasonably when it deemed cost
irrelevant to the decision to regulate power plants.”17 Justice Scalia,
writing for the majority, bluntly stated, “[I]t is unreasonable to read an
instruction to an administrative agency to determine whether
regulation is appropriate and necessary as an invitation to ignore cost.”
18

Michigan’s contribution to the practice of cost consideration is
twofold: 1) it established a connection between cost consideration and
administrative rationality, thereby giving a primary role to cost in the
application of the arbitrary and capricious standard of review; and 2)
it articulated a new default rule for interpreting statutes that are silent
or ambiguous.

14. Pursuant to § 7412(n)(1)(A), power plants are listed as source categories
based on the results of EPA’s assessment of the hazards to public health that are
reasonably anticipated to occur after other CAA requirements are imposed on power
plants. The provision does not further specify what factors are relevant in the listing
phase, nor does it mention cost consideration. At the subsequent standard-setting
phase, the EPA makes the threshold determination of emissions limits based on the
following criteria: 1) the maximum achievable degree of reduction in emissions of
pollutants; 2) the cost of achieving such emissions reduction; 3) any non-air quality
health and environmental impacts, and 4) energy requirements. It should be noted
that the statute explicitly mentions cost as a factor in the standard-setting phase, in
contrast with the regulation of the listing phase.
15. Reply Brief of Petitioner Utility Air Regulatory Group, et al. at 9-12,
Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015) (Nos. 14-46, 14-47, 14-49), 2015 WL
1247184.
16. White Stallion Energy Ctr., LLC v. EPA, 748 F.3d 1222, 1237 (D.C. Cir.
2014).
17. Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2712.
18. Id. at 2708.
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A. The Arbitrariness of Cost-Blindness
In Michigan, the Supreme Court articulated a connection between
cost consideration and the rationality of an agency’s administrative
action. Consideration of cost is no longer just a feature of reasonable
statutory interpretation; it is now an indispensable trait of rational
administrative action.19 From this perspective, the (indeterminate)
statutory expression “appropriate and necessary” must be read in light
of the established administrative rule of law, according to which an
agency rule is considered “arbitrary and capricious” if the agency
relies on factors that Congress had not intended it to consider, or if it
fails to consider an important aspect of the problem. 20 Based on this
premise, an agency’s failure to engage with costs must be regarded by
courts as an arbitrary action; this behavior can be referred to as costblindness.
In this manner, Michigan shifted the source of an agency’s duty to
consider costs (in the case of an ambiguous or silent statute) from
statutory authority to the principles of reasoned administrative
decision-making. Before Michigan, the Supreme Court approached the
issue of cost consideration as one concerning the scope of an agency’s
statutory authority. Using what is known as the Chevron two-step test,
the Court would apply traditional tools of statutory interpretation to
determine whether Congress had spoken directly to the question at
issue.21 If the Court determined that the statute was silent or ambiguous
with respect to the specific issue under agency consideration, it asked
whether the agency’s construction of the statute was a reasonable one
and, as such, warranted Chevron deference (i.e., the Court defers to the
agency’s reasonable interpretation).
In Michigan, the Court acknowledged that the statute was
ambiguous about the requirement of cost consideration, thereby
satisfying step one of the test. It then articulated an innovative
interpretation of the second step of the Chevron test, based on the
19. See Grossman, supra note 6, at 282; Masur & Posner, supra note 6, at 35;
Packard, supra note 6, at 118; Sunstein, supra note 6, at 16.
20. See Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
21. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467
U. S. 837, 843 (1984).
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rationality doctrine: when determining permissible statutory
interpretation, courts should regard cost considerations as required
under any statutory framework that does not expressly preclude them.
In this way, the area of permissible statutory interpretation overlaps
with the area of reasonable exercise of administrative discretion. As
Grossman noted, in Michigan the “Chevron step-two reasonableness
analysis parallels arbitrary-and-capricious review.”22 Under this legal
framework, the majority found that the EPA went far beyond the
bounds of reasonable action when it read section 7412(n)(1) to mean
it could ignore costs when making a listing decision.23
B. The Default Cost-Benefit Rule in Michigan
Michigan alters the structure of the default cost-benefit rule that
operates when the relevant statute is silent or ambiguous. Before
Michigan, the Supreme Court had interpreted silent or ambiguous
statutory provisions as reflecting congressional intent to defer to
agencies as to whether and how they would engage in cost-benefits
analysis.24 Michigan flips the default position from one that permits to

22. Grossman, supra note 6, at 294. See also Catherine M. Sharkey, In the Wake
of Chevron’s Retreat, GEORGE MASON CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE REVISITING JUDICIAL DEFERENCE CONFERENCE (1995),
https://sls.gmu.edu/csas/wp-content/uploads/sites/29/2016/06/Sharkey_In-theWake-of-Chevron_5_20_16.pdf.
23. Justice Scalia wrote, “Chevron allows agencies to choose among competing
reasonable interpretations of a statute; it does not license interpretive gerrymanders
under which an agency keeps parts of statutory context it likes while throwing away
parts it does not.” Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2708.
24. In American Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, the Supreme Court held that
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration was not required to engage in
cost-benefit analysis when setting “feasible” public health and safety standards. 452
U.S. 490, 510-12 (1981). In the absence of express statutory authorization, the Court
suggested a presumption against the use of CBA. In Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper,
Inc., the Court found that the fact that the statute did not expressly authorize CBA
could not be interpreted as limiting the agency’s discretion. 556 U.S. 208, 222-23
(2009). Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, stated, “It is eminently reasonable to
conclude that [statutory] silence is meant to convey nothing more than a refusal to
tie the agency’s hands as to whether cost-benefit analysis should be used, and if so
to what degree.” Id.
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one that mandates consideration of costs.25 By enlarging the word
“appropriate” to require that the EPA consider cost, the Supreme Court
established a strong legal presumption that all agencies are obligated
to give adequate consideration to cost in the absence of an express
statutory provision to the contrary. In light of this principle, the EPA’s
refusal to consider costs could only be deemed reasonable if Congress
itself expressly precluded cost consideration, or if costs were not a
relevant factor of the issue under the agency’s review. By altering the
default cost-benefit rule, Michigan incrementally shifted the allocation
of law-making powers from agencies to courts.
Two points must be emphasized. First, the Court was unanimous in
finding that the EPA is required to consider costs and that this
obligation stems from both the statutory scheme and background
principles of administrative law.26 However, the Justices disagree on
when in the regulatory process cost considerations should be taken into
account.27 Second, Michigan leaves unanswered a number of
fundamental questions concerning the content of cost consideration; in
particular, why cost consideration must be a requisite of administrative
rationality. This question must be addressed in order to specify the
prescriptive meaning of the Michigan principle that an agency that
ignores costs acts arbitrarily. That is the analytical direction in which
this article is now headed.

25. Michigan contrasts with the Supreme Court’s decision in Whitman v.
American Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457 (2001). In Whitman, the Court
reasoned that ambiguity in the language of the enabling statute forbid regulation
based on consideration of costs. Id. at 467. Justice Scalia, writing for the majority,
asserted that agencies could consider costs only if Congress had clearly authorized
them to do so. Id. The Court ruled unanimously that Section 109 of the CAA
precluded consideration of implementation costs in setting air quality standards. Id.
at 477-86. In Michigan, Justice Scalia stated that Whitman was not applicable,
because the “appropriate and necessary” standard is more comprehensive than the
“protection of public health” standard used in Whitman. Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at
2709.
26. See Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2707-08.
27. Justice Kagan’s dissenting opinion argues that cost should be considered at
the standard-setting phase, not the listing phase, and emphasizes the central
relevance of cost to reasoned administrative action: See id. at 2714-17 (Kagan, J.
dissenting).
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II. COST CONSIDERATION AS A RATIONALITY REQUIREMENT
In Michigan, the need for cost consideration is based upon the
normative principle that a rational administrative action is one that
produces more good than harm.28 This principle compels an agency to
explain why a proposed regulation will be beneficial. However, the
logical and axiological connection between cost and rationality
remains unclear. The Court does not provide an articulated explanation
of the reasons why producing more good than harm should be regarded
as a feature of administrative rationality, nor does it mention how cost
consideration can help determine whether a regulation produces more
good than harm. As a result, the Michigan principle that rationality
requires cost consideration fails to provide a clear prescriptive
meaning.
In order to establish that rationality requires cost consideration, the
Court must explain why producing more good than harm is a requisite
of rationality and specify what good and what harm matter to whom.
“Good” and “harm” are meaningful concepts only to the extent that
they are selective normative judgments on whose interests count.
Therefore, to conclude that a regulation must produce more good than
harm one must first identify whose interest must be a cost to whom.
Only by doing so will the normative baseline to assess whether good
exceeds harm become available. In addition, the Court should have
outlined the procedural requirements that are determinative in
conferring rationality on the administrative action and how cost
consideration as a decision procedure meets these requirements. This
step is essential to defining the requirements of rational, non-arbitrary
administrative decision-making. These three logical steps are needed
to establish a connection between cost consideration and the rationality
of administrative action, thereby determining the prescriptive meaning
of the Michigan principle. Table 1 summarizes the discussion.

28. See id. at 2707 (“No regulation is appropriate if it does significantly more
harm than good.”).
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Table 1. Deconstructing the cost-rationality nexus
Step 1
Step 2
Step 3

Based on what notion of rationality is regulation required to
produce more good than harm?
What is the set of relevant interests that matters in defining
what good and harm matter to whom?
What are the procedural requirements that confer rationality
on administrative action and determine whether cost
consideration meets these requirements?
A. Rationality and Social Welfare Maximization

Proponents of CBA hold the assumption that rational administrative
agencies should work to increase social welfare.29 In this view,
administrative rationality largely overlaps with economic rationality
and, in particular, with the notion of social welfare maximization. In
its most recent and accurate formulation, this account of rationality
carefully distinguishes a moral criterion from a decision procedure.30
The moral criterion defines the features of the morally desirable
outcomes. The decision procedure is the technique for making choices
that reach these desirable outcomes. From this analytical standpoint, a
rational administrative action is grounded on weak welfarism as a
moral criterion, and on CBA as a decision procedure.31 Weak
welfarism aggregates individual preferences that are self-interested
and survive idealization, producing morally desirable outcomes that
maximize overall well-being.32 CBA and other procedures for
considering costs provide agencies a means by which to measure the
effects of proposed regulatory actions on an affected population.33
We do not dispute the merit of weak welfarism as a moral criterion.
We fundamentally agree, from a philosophical standpoint, that
29. See MATTHEW D. ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COSTBENEFIT ANALYSIS (2006); RICHARD L. REVESZ & MICHAEL A. LIVERMORE,
RETAKING RATIONALITY (2008).
30. ADLER & POSNER, supra note 29, at 62.
31. See id. at 25-100.
32. Id. at 124–153.
33. Id. at 73–100.
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administrative action should serve to enhance overall well-being.34
Instead, we comment on the second assumption, that cost
consideration must be regarded as a constitutive element of
administrative rationality because it provides a method for
determining whether regulations increase social welfare.35 While this
account of the cost/rationality nexus captures one important functional
dimension of cost consideration in the regulatory context, it tends to
overlook the normative nature of the concept of cost. This involves the
risk of potentially misguided applications of both cost consideration
by agencies and arbitrary and capricious review by courts.
The cost/rationality nexus, as we have outlined above, comprises
three definitional steps: rationality, interests, and procedure. When
cost consideration is explained exclusively in terms of social welfare
maximization, a jump is made from step one (i.e., rationality as social
welfare maximization) to step three (i.e., rational administrative action
should rest on cost-benefit balancing), while step two (i.e., what costs
and benefits to whom) is overlooked.36 To better illuminate the
cost/rationality nexus, step two must be integrated into the more
conventional account of the cost/rationality nexus. That is, we need to
examine the normative dimension of the concept of cost and its
institutional implications.

34. A discussion of the complex methodological issues associated with both the
definition and measurement of social welfare construct is beyond the scope of this
paper. For a comprehensive discussion, see MATTHEW D. ADLER & MARC
FLEURBAEY, THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF WELL-BEING AND PUBLIC POLICY (2016).
35. See ADLER & POSNER, supra note 29 at 26, 62-63; Sunstein, supra note 6, at
9-10.
36. One could argue that proponents of weak welfarism address step two by using
restrictive criteria in the set of relevant preferences. However, it is one thing to refine
preferences by excluding non-ideal or disinterest preferences, and another to delimit
the welfare space by way of political choices as to whose interests count. The former
focuses on the quality of the formation process of preferences and therefore pertains
to the qualitative definition of the social welfare construct (step one). The second is
a function of a political choice of whose interests count (step two).
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B. What Costs and Benefits to Whom?
1. Cost is a Relational Concept
Cost is a metric used to measure the impact of procuring, producing,
or acquiring a benefit or utility on a set of relevant interests—interests
that are registered and valorized as a “cost” to be imposed on
someone.37 In addition, cost often emerges in the context of
structurally reciprocal relationships, where benefits to someone cannot
be considered independently of the cost to someone else.38 The
reciprocal nature of costs implies that the decision over whose interests
are registered and valorized as costs to others is necessarily a function
of the process of choosing. The cost is the result of a choice as to who
will have the right to impose his or her own interests as costs to others
and who will be exposed to the exercise of those rights.
The concept of opportunity costs helps to explain these features.
Cost is opportunity set specific – that is, the cost of a choice or line of
conduct is a function of a set of available opportunities.39 Individuals’
opportunity sets are fundamentally shaped by conflicts between
competing interests. Given the existence of constraints on the
satisfaction of all interests present in society, the fulfillment of
someone’s interests often limits the opportunity set of someone else’s
interest.40 Hence, it is often the case that one element x of A’s
opportunity set produces an adverse impact upon B’s opportunity set.
That is, x represents the interests of A for which B must pay. In short,
interest scarcity determines the structure of individuals’ opportunity
sets.41
This is an important methodological point: determining a cost
requires identifying those individuals whose interests are to become a
cost to someone else.42 This, in turn, suggests that cost is a relational
concept. Cost is not a function of any intrinsic substance and does not
have an independent ontological status. What is regarded as either cost
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

MEDEMA ET AL., supra note 9, at 213-14.
Id.
Id. at 233.
Id. at 228
Id. at 229.
Id. at 228-229.
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or benefit is determined by implicit normative assumptions on whose
interest should be made a cost to whom.43 Rather than being a merely
technical assessment, the determination of cost is a positional exercise.
Cost is interest-specific.
This relational nature often leads to a serious problem of logical
circularity, which arises when normative specifications underlying
cost consideration are not clearly articulated. When logical circularity
occurs, as Samuels observes, “the analyst assumes something about
the object to be determined that governs the determination.”44 Applied
to cost consideration, logical circularity occurs when costs are used to
specify rights and rights are used to specify costs. In this way, logical
circularity deprives cost consideration of any meaningful content.45
To make normative premises as explicit as possible and to avoid
logical circularity, any consideration of costs should define in advance
the set of relevant interests. Applied to legal discourse, this principle
entails that an obligation to consider costs is deprived of meaningful
prescriptive content unless it is preceded by a clear specification of the
antecedent normative premises of whose interests and what interests
count.46
2. Cost is Right-Specific
Once the normative nature of cost has been clarified, the next step is
to determine whether and to what extent the normative premises
underpinning the language of cost are internal to legal-economic
discourse. The structure of legal entitlements shapes the individual’s
opportunity set that, in turn, determines the costs structure. More
specifically, the law regulates the normative premises governing the
selection of both 1) interests to be registered and valorized as costs to
others, and 2) interests upon whom these costs should be imposed. The
43. Id. at 231.
44. Warren J. Samuels, Normative Premises in Regulatory Theory, 1 J. POST

KEYNESIAN ECON. 100, 100 (1978).
45. See A. Allen Schmid, All Environmental Policy Instruments Require a Moral
Choice as to Whose Interests Count, in ECONOMICS, ETHICS, AND ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY: CONTESTED CHOICES 133, 135 (Daniel W. Bromley & Jouni Paavola eds.,
2002).
46. Amy Sinden, Douglas A. Kysar, & David M. Driesen, Cost-Benefit Analysis:
New Foundations on Shifting Sand, 3 REG. & GOV. 48, 56 (2009).
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interests of some are made a cost to others through the definition,
allocation, and enforcement of legal entitlements.47 In addition,
changes in the allocation of legal rights determine changes in the
structure and allocation of costs. In essence, cost is right-specific,48
meaning the language of cost cannot be used to specify rights.
C. The Contribution of Cost Consideration to Administrative
Rationality
1. Cost as a “Relevant” Factor
Cost consideration is a necessary requirement of administrative
rationality to the extent that cost is to be regarded as a “relevant factor”
in light of the statute.49 In fact, cost is almost always a relevant factor
in regulation. It must be recognized, however, that the right- and
interest-specific nature of cost affects the content of relevant factor
analysis. Due to its intrinsic normative nature, costs are made relevant
to the administrative action through a two-step process. First, as stated
previously, cost is registered and valorized as such by legally defining
the set of relevant interests. Statutes determine whose interests count
and whose interests should be made a cost to whom. Then, once the
set of relevant interests is defined, cost is made relevant to a specific
administrative matter as one of the factors to be considered in
articulating a satisfactory explanation for the administrative conduct.
Understanding this twofold process of cost “juridicization” is key to
truly comprehending the cost/rationality nexus and to identifying the
proper degree of judicial deference toward agency cost consideration.

47. MEDEMA ET AL., supra note 9.
48. Id.
49. To satisfy the requirements imposed by the APA’s ban on arbitrariness, the

administration must “articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action.” Motor
Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,
43 (1983). In reviewing that explanation, courts must consider whether “the agency
has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider” or entirely failed
to consider an aspect of the problem deemed important in light of the statutory
framework. Id.
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2. Cost Determination Versus Cost Quantification
We identify two logically independent steps of cost consideration:
cost determination and cost quantification. They correspond to step
two and step three previously identified in Table 1. Cost determination
involves a decision on how to allocate legal rights between competing
interests, recognizing that a set of relevant interests must be made a
cost upon the interests of another. This decision rests on political
considerations and moral factors that are independent of the concept
of cost. Because cost is the outcome of cost determination, cost
determination cannot be based on any consideration of costs. The
recognition that cost determination precedes cost quantification, and
that it is legal in nature, indicates that the structure of legal rights is an
institutional determinant of the structure of cost. Cost is first
determined through the allocation of legal rights by evaluating a series
of political and moral factors pertaining to the choice of whose
interests count, and then it is quantified using weights and ranks.
Cost quantification, meanwhile, determines how much one set of
interests is made a cost to someone else’s interest. That is, it measures
the degree of burden imposed on one set of interests for the satisfaction
or protection of another set of competing interest. Cost quantification
assumes cost determination in order to function. Unlike cost
determination, cost quantification is logically based on the concept of
cost.
3. Deconstructing the Rationality Review of Cost Consideration
The distinction between cost determination and cost quantification
explains the twofold contribution that cost consideration provides to
administrative rationality. First, cost consideration improves the
rationality of administrative action by illuminating whose interests
count, and whose interests are made a cost to whom. Second, by
providing a methodology for determining whether the effects of a
proposed administrative action increase social welfare, cost
consideration is able to enhance administrative rationality.
These considerations suggest that administrative rationality is
reflective of the twofold process of cost juridicization. A strong legal
trajectory in favor of CBA recognizes that rational administrative
action must rely on an adequate explanation of cost-benefit balancing.
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It is arbitrary and capricious to promulgate a regulation without
comparing the magnitudes of costs and benefits (i.e., cost-blindness).50
Absent statutory provision, any decision to not quantify costs and
benefits, or to show that benefits justify the costs, requires the agency
to provide a reasoned explanation justifying cost-blindness.51
However, an administrative action can be deemed arbitrary for reasons
beyond simply failing to perform cost quantification.52 A reasonable
administrative action must be based on a transparent, accountable
definition of the set of affected relevant interests. Therefore, a charge
of arbitrariness might be leveled against an agency that acts
inconsistently with the definition of the set of interests provided by
statute; this behavior can be referred to as cost inconsistency. A
regulation is cost-inconsistent when it is based on a language of costs
and benefits that is not consistent with the set of interests set forth in,
or taken as inference from, the statutory framework. In brief, the
distinction between cost determination and cost quantification brings
to light a further distinction between cost-inconsistency and costblindness.
This distinction unveils two targeted inquiries of the arbitrariness
review of agency cost consideration. One objective of arbitrariness
review is to assess the consistency of regulatory action with the cost
determination established by statute. Courts ask whether the
administrative conduct is consistent with the definition of the set of
relevant interests—and therefore relevant benefits and costs—
provided by the applicable statute. While the arbitrariness assessment
of an agency’s cost determination focuses on the definition of the set
of interests affected by the administrative action, the arbitrariness
assessment of cost quantification, the second objective of arbitrariness
review, is centered on measuring the consequences of administrative
conduct on these interests (see Table 2). Cost quantification improves
administrative rationality by providing a method for measuring the
benefits and costs of a proposed regulatory action,53 and it properly
pertains to the institutional scope of the administrative process. Hence,
50.
51.
52.
53.

Sunstein, supra note 6, at 9.
Id.
Id.
On the relationship between CBA and arbitrariness review, see Masur &
Posner, supra note 6; Sunstein, supra note 6.
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the arbitrariness review focuses on the adequacy of the agency’s
consideration of the consequences of its action on the set of relevant
interests. To make this determination, courts ask whether the agency
has specified and measured the relevant benefits and costs, whether it
has determined that the anticipated benefits are higher than costs, and
whether it has provided a reasoned explanation if not.
Table 2. Rationality Review and the Twofold Process of Cost
Consideration
Cost Determination

Cost Quantification

Rationality Review
Courts should review whether the agency’s
decision actually relies on, and is consistent
with, the statutory definition of the set of
relevant interests.
Courts should review the adequacy of the
agency’s consideration of the consequences
of administrative action on the set of
relevant interests.54

D. Rationality Review and Statutory Indeterminacy
Any account of the cost/rationality nexus must be qualified in light
of the allocation of decision-making powers that pertain to cost
consideration across legal institutions. This section identifies the
degree of statutory determinacy as the major determinant of the
institutional allocation of decision-making powers. We argue that
arbitrariness review should reflect the varying degrees of statutory
determinacy.
Four general directives derive from the structure of the
constitutional-administrative system. First, Congress has the exclusive
constitutional authority to define the set of relevant interests
underlying cost determination. Second, Congress has the exclusive

54. As we will clarify later, “adequacy” is intended both as compliance with the
cost-benefit balancing treatment provided by statute and, after Michigan, consistency
with the principles of reasoned decision-making.
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authority to mandate agencies to consider costs.55 Third, an agency
rule is deemed arbitrary and capricious if it relies on factors that
Congress has not intended it to consider.56 Fourth, courts strike down
agency actions that fail to consider factors that are relevant by statute.57
Within the framework defined by these general principles, cost
determination is primarily performed thorough the political-legislative
process, while cost quantification is performed by agencies and
reviewed by courts in the case of judicial dispute.
Based on this institutional framework, which grants priority to
statutes over alternative sources of law with respect to cost
determination, the allocation of choices involved in the process of cost
consideration is largely a function of 1) the statutory definition of the
set of relevant interests, and 2) the statutory provisions empowering
agencies to use cost consideration. Institutional issues arise when the
statutory framework is indeterminate with respect to one or both
elements. When a statute is silent or ambiguous, the allocation of
decision-making powers deviates considerably from the constitutional
architecture outlined above. Arbitrariness review, which provides a
check against unrestrained agency power and interference, must
therefore be further qualified to reflect the varying degree of
determinacy of statutes (and the resulting changes in power
allocations) with respect to both cost determination and cost
quantification.
1. Cost Determination and Statutory Indeterminacy
When the statutory definition of interests is unclear or indeterminate,
agencies might play a role in the cost determination process. Agency’s
policy judgments underlying the interpretation of the indeterminate
statute influence the specification process of the set of relevant
interests (i.e., the definition of whose interests should be made a cost
to whom). When such ambiguity occurs, arbitrariness review asks
55. According, to pre-Michigan case law, statutory silence or ambiguity should
not be interpreted as “mandating” agencies to perform cost consideration. See
Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2707-08 (2015); Id. at 2716-17 (Kagan, J.,
dissenting).
56. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43.
57. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2)(A) (1988).
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whether an agency’s own choices, with respect to the definition of the
relevant interests, satisfy the rationality requirements. Indeed,
statutory silence or ambiguity regarding the definition of relevant
interests makes it even more necessary for agencies to create
transparent decision-making procedures and account for the
deliberation of whose interests are made a cost to whom. Therefore,
when conducting an arbitrariness review, courts should recognize and
award credit to political considerations that occur during the agency
rulemaking process.58 This raises the difficult question of whether
rationality review should allow political considerations to explain
administrative decision-making. Watts has convincingly argued that
courts should distinguish between “rational and logically relevant
political influences that we can presume Congress intended the agency
to be able to consider” and “those sorts of corrupting political
influences that Congress would not intend an agency to consider.”59
From this perspective, courts should assess whether the political
considerations influencing an agency’s cost determination are “tied to
the public values or policies being implemented by the statutory
scheme” and whether “Congress [can] be presumed to have authorized
agency reliance on such factors.”60
2. Cost Quantification and Statutory Indeterminacy
A statutory framework often provides various indications to
agencies as to the process of cost quantification. When the content of
cost quantification is defined by statute, courts are required to ask
whether an agency’s cost quantification complies with statutory
provisions.61 However, when a statute is silent or indeterminate on cost
58. See EDLEY, supra note 12; Kagan, supra note 12, at 2380-2381; Watts, supra
note 12. For arguments in opposition, see Enrique Armijo, Politics, Rulemaking, and
Judicial Review: A Response to Professor Watts, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 573 (2010);
Mark Seidenfeld, The Irrelevance of Politics for Arbitrary and Capricious
Review, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 141 (2012).
59. Watts, supra note 12, at 52.
60. Id. at 54.
61. For example, many statutes expressly include cost as one of the factors to be
taken into consideration by agency alongside a number of other factors. Other
statutes more explicitly mandate agencies to balance costs against benefits. Still
others require agencies to regulate “to the extent feasible.” For an overview of the
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quantification, significant portions of decision-making power are
allocated to agencies and/or courts. When this occurs, agencies engage
in their own cost-benefit balancing based on “default” principles that
have emerged in federal common law.62
When a challenge to a regulation reaches a court, judges assess
whether the agency’s cost quantification satisfies the rationality
requirements. This raises questions of what, precisely, agencies are
permitted to do (given Congress’ silence on cost quantification), and
to what extent judges can review agencies’ quantified evaluation of
their regulations.63 What must be emphasized is that Congress’ silence
on cost quantification should not involve an increased allocation of
decision-making powers to agencies and courts as to cost
determination. We will argue in the next section that the line of
reasoning followed by the Supreme Court in Michigan made this
precise error by conflating the logic of cost quantification with that of
cost determination in interpreting the relevant statutory provision.
Based on these considerations we draw a four-cell matrix (Table 3)
that summarizes the content of rationality review as a function of two
variables: the degree of statutory determinacy and the cost
determination/cost quantification stage.

various forms of statutory treatment of cost quantification, see Cass R. Sunstein,
Cost-Benefit Default Principles, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1651 (2001); Masur & Posner,
supra note 6, at Appendix.
62. See Sunstein, supra note 61, at 1655; Masur & Posner, supra note 6, at 3940.
63. A detailed examination about these issues is outside the scope of this paper.
For further information, see Sunstein, supra note 6; Pierce, supra note 4; Jonathan
Cannon, The Sounds of Silence: Cost-Benefit Canons in Entergy Corp. v.
Riverkeeper, Inc., 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 425 (2010); Masur & Posner, supra note
6; Schratz, supra note 6.
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Table 3. Cost Consideration and Statutory Determinacy
Determinate Statute

Cost
Determination

Cost
Quantification

Indeterminate
Statute
Courts should review Courts should review
whether the agency’s whether the agency’s
decision actually
own cost
relies on, and is
determination
consistent with, the
satisfies hard look
statutory definition of review, distinguishing
the set of relevant
between legitimate
interests.
and illegitimate
political influence.
Courts should review Courts should review
whether the agency’s
the adequacy of the
agency’s
own cost
consideration of the
quantification is
consistent with the
consequences of
administrative action principles of reasoned
on the set of relevant decision-making.
interests.

III. MICHIGAN REVISITED THROUGH THE LENS OF INTERESTS
Our proposed conceptual framework of the cost/rationality nexus
helps us to analyze the primary question in Michigan: whether the EPA
acted unreasonably in refusing to consider costs at the listing phase.
As previously noted, the Court addresses this issue of statutory
interpretation from the perspective of rational of administrative
decision-making. The Court establishes a connection between cost and
rationality; based on this connection, it reads a requirement of cost
quantification into section 7412(n)(1)(A) of the CAA. We contend that
the Supreme Court’s arguments regarding the cost/rationality nexus
were inconclusive, leading to a decision that is inconsistent with
Congress’ cost determination and that produces problematic
institutional implications.
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A. The Irrelevance of Cost Quantification at the Listing Phase
In Michigan, the Supreme Court held that the EPA acted
unreasonably when, in refusing to consider costs at the listing phase, it
failed to provide justification that the proposed regulation would
produce more good than harm.64 However, if one examines the facts
in Michigan through the lens of the interest- and right-based theory of
the cost-rationality nexus, the holding appears problematic. The
fundamental flaw of the Court’s reasoning was to conflate the logic of
cost determination with that of cost quantification. This analytical
confusion led the Court to formulate a canon of administrative
rationality that is inconsistent with statutory cost determination.
As described above, three steps must be followed to establish a
connection between cost consideration and the rationality of
administrative action. A rational administrative action is aimed at
maximizing one or more dimensions of social welfare (step one).
Social welfare is defined through a critical evaluation of whose welfare
counts (step two). Cost quantification reveals what level of regulation
is welfare-maximizing (step three). The decision whether to regulate
pertains to steps one and two. It requires defining both the regulatory
goal (“what good and harm?”) and the set of relevant interests (“whose
good and harm?”) in light of the relevant statutory scheme. These two
steps enable the agency to explain what costs should be imposed upon
whom and for what purposes. However, the Court in Michigan
assesses the rationality of administrative action against the principle
that regulation should promote more good than harm. By posing the
question, “does regulation do more good than harm?” rather than,
“which costs should be imposed upon whom and for what purposes?”
the Court loses sight of step two, thereby assessing the rationality of
administrative action without previously clarifying the content of cost
determination.
The decision whether to regulate power plant emissions turns on the
issue of cost determination, that is, the choice between competing
interests. Benefits to polluters, workers, and consumers associated
with the production of coal emissions are reciprocally associated with
the unrealized benefits to the public resulting from a reduction in
64. Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2707 (2015).
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pollutants emissions. The reciprocal nature of the costs of pollution
implies that costs are the result of a choice as to who will have the right
to impose his or her own interests as costs to others and who will be
exposed to the exercise of those rights. If one wants to register and
valorize the public interest in health and environmental protection, that
interest must be made a cost to producers, workers, and consumers.
CAA provisions should be interpreted consistently with this cost
determination underlying the statutory scheme. Instead of assessing
the rationality of administrative action in terms of the consistency with
statutory cost determination, the Court in Michigan imposes the
requirement of cost quantification onto the agency.
The set of legally relevant interests at the listing phase (and what
interests are visited upon by the corresponding costs) is
unambiguously statutorily defined. Congress, through the language of
the CAA, has established that the public interest in health and welfare
should be made a cost to producers, consumers, and workers.65 Based
on this congressional directive, the EPA must conduct a factual inquiry
that identifies concrete sources of pollution. Once a source of pollution
has been identified, it must be added to the list of major sources of
pollution that fall within the objective scope of application of the
CAA.66 The EPA’s decision to include power plants on the list of
sources registers and valorizes the public interest in health and welfare
as a cost to polluters, consumers, and workers. All the EPA must
determine is whether the physical sources of pollution warrant
regulation pursuant to statutory cost determination. If so, it must
proceed to impose the regulatory burden on power plants with all
consequent compliance costs. The assessment is a technical one based
on a political and moral framework established by Congress; there is
no room for cost quantification at the listing phase. Cost quantification
pertains to a subsequent conceptual step and later regulatory stage,
wherein it is decided how much the interests that count should be made
a cost to competing interests.
The EPA acted reasonably, as it made its determination based on,
and consistent with, a clear definition of the set of relevant interests
provided by the statute. Yet the Court’s ruling invoked the assumption
65. See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)(A).
66. Id. at § 7412(b)(2).
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that regulation should do more good than harm. By relying on this
assumption, the Court assessed the reasonableness of the EPA’s
administrative action against a principle that pertains to cost
quantification. However, as repeatedly noted, the EPA’s sole task at
the listing phase is to make an empirical assessment based on
unambiguous statutory cost determination. Therefore, the Court made
a serious error in holding that the EPA acted unreasonably in failing to
justify its decision. Because the only cost decision relevant to the
listing phase is one of cost determination, the reasonableness of the
EPA’s action cannot be assessed against the principles of rationality
governing cost quantification.
The foregoing considerations enable us to recognize the logical
inconsistency of the majority’s reasoning. First, Justice Scalia argues
that the phrase “appropriate and necessary” entails a larger scope of
protection, one that includes compliance costs imposed by the
regulation of power plants.67 This argument unduly extends the set of
interests relevant to the listing phase. According to the comprehensive
framework designed by the CAA, the public interest to health and
welfare must be made a cost to the interest of polluters.68 The CAA
embodies Congress’ value judgment that the benefits of achieving
clean, healthy air are worth the cost to polluters. By interpreting the
phrase, “appropriate and necessary,” as one that includes the polluters’
interests within its scope of protection, Justice Scalia arbitrarily altered
the cost determination provided by statute. In registering the polluters’
interests as interests to be made a cost to the public’s interest to health,
Michigan defeats the purpose of the CAA.
Second, Michigan imposed the requirement of cost quantification on
a statutorily pre-determined choice among competing interests. The
trouble with this is that, as we have seen, cost determination precedes
quantification; it is therefore illogical to impose cost quantification as
a requirement for cost determination.
Finally, by reading an obligation of cost quantification into the
statutory definition of the listing phase, the Supreme Court introduced
an additional procedural requirement not mentioned in the APA. One
might claim this latter objection is irrelevant because Michigan states
67. Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2709.
68. See, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)(A).
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that an agency that ignores costs acts arbitrarily, and acting arbitrarily
is unlawful under the APA.69 However, the problem with this counter
objection is that the Supreme Court did not convincingly identify a
canon of rationality under which ignoring costs at the listing phase
should be deemed an arbitrary action. Instead, the Court simply
assessed the EPA’s refusal to consider costs against a rationality
standard (i.e., the EPA should provide reasons that the proposed
regulation would do more harm than good) that pertains to the cost
quantification stage and does not fit the listing phase. In short, the
Supreme Court, not the EPA, foisted cost inconsistency on agencies,
by rendering a decision that subverts the statutorily prescribed value
choices as to whose interests should be made a cost to whom made at
the statutory level.
B. Does the Michigan Default Rule Produce More Harm Than
Good?
If courts read Michigan as establishing that reasonable regulation
requires cost quantification at each regulatory stage, then Michigan
will have costly repercussions. By imposing cost quantification at the
listing phase, Michigan may undermine the effect of many regulatory
schemes, thereby defeating congressional intent. This is not an
incidental effect of the Supreme Court’s ruling, but the inevitable
result of a rule that anticipates the cost quantification phase.
Additionally, conditioning the listing decision on cost quantification
might significantly increase the transaction costs associated with the
regulatory process. Because costs depend on regulatory options that
the EPA can only choose after an initial listing decision, cost
quantification may be unfeasible at the listing phase. Until the EPA
knows which standards it will set, it cannot know what costs such
standards will impose. Cost calculations are highly variable and
depend on several factors, including the targets being set, the
69. For example, Sunstein, supra note 6, at 16, argues that: “Michigan v. EPA
has the great virtue of identifying the fatal weakness in [the] tempting objection . . .
that courts lack the authority to impose procedural requirements . . . . As Michigan
v. EPA suggests, the problem with the objection is that under the APA. . . . [i]f an
agency ignores costs, or imposes a risk that is greater than the risk that it is reducing,
it would seem to be acting arbitrarily.”
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technologies and methods that will be utilized, and the stringency of
the standards. Moreover, premature cost considerations could be
misleading, because “the more stringent option is not necessarily the
more costly.”70 Finally, technological developments, which contribute
to the decline of compliance costs, cause cost estimations to become
quickly outdated. It should be noted that no reasonable methodologies
on how to include cost calculations at the listing phase have been
presented by the Court.
The new default rule also raises concerns as to its institutional
implications, which may prove critical to future environmental and
public health regulations. Michigan applies a presumption in favor of
cost consideration by the Court, based on the argument that in the
regulatory context a reasonable understanding of the relevant statutory
factor is almost always conducive to the conclusion that cost is a
relevant factor.71 The broad language used by the Court suggests that
cost consideration must be regarded as a requirement of any reasonable
regulation, unless Congress clearly speaks in favor of cost-blindness.72
That is, an agency’s duty to consider costs is rooted in judicial
understanding of the APA’s ban on arbitrariness and is largely
independent of the statutory scheme. As Justice Scalia states,
“consideration of cost reflects the understanding that reasonable
regulation ordinarily requires paying attention to the
advantages and the disadvantages of agency decisions” and the
70. Brief of the Institute for Policy Integrity at New York University School of
Law, as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 36, Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct.
2699 (2015), (Nos. 14-46, 14-47, 14-19).
71. Justice Scalia states, “Consideration of cost reflects the understanding that
reasonable regulation ordinarily requires paying attention to the advantages and the
disadvantages of agency decisions.” Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2707 (emphasis added).
Justice Kagan’s dissenting opinion agrees with the majority on this point and
emphasizes: “Cost is almost always a relevant—and usually, a highly important—
factor in regulation.” Id. at 2716 (Kagan, J. dissenting).
72. “This language is not tied to the particular facts or statutory scheme in
Michigan. Instead, it seems to create a presumption that ‘reasonable regulation’ in
general necessitates some attention to cost . . . the majority’s aforementioned broad
language suggests the . . . possibility that cost may now be a ‘relevant factor’ or
‘important aspect of the problem’ whenever an agency decides whether or how to
regulate.” Note, Clear Air Act—Cost-Benefit Analysis—Michigan v. EPA, 129
HARV. L. REV. 311, 317-18 (2015).
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“[s]tatutory context reinforces the relevance of cost.”73 Therefore, in
the Court’s view, the relevance of cost supersedes the specific statutory
scheme at issue. However, in failing to clearly distinguish between the
two separate steps of cost determination and cost quantification, the
Michigan decision unduly extends the power of courts to interfere with
both an agency’s decision-making and the statutory definition of legal
rights.
This rule increases the costs for Congress of legislative inertia by
imposing on the legislative branch the burden to expressly preclude
cost quantification when it intends to exclude cost-benefit balancing at
a given regulatory stage. While this may not be a concern in cases
where cost quantification produces effective regulation, it is an issue
when cost quantification is required of agencies surreptitiously, as an
antiregulatory device. Furthermore, as we have seen, the more
indeterminate the statutory definition of rights, the more penetrating
the Court’s rationality assessment. In brief, by increasing the
intrusiveness of the arbitrary and capricious standard of judicial
review, Michigan may significantly hinder the effectiveness of
regulatory action. In her dissenting opinion, Justice Kagan
acknowledges this point when stating that the majority’s reasoning
resulted in “a decision that deprives the American public of the
pollution control measures that the responsible Agency, acting well
within its delegated authority, found would save many, many lives.” 74
CONCLUSION
In time, Michigan may create more harm than good. By conflating
the logic of cost determination with that of cost quantification when
assessing the EPA’s administrative action, and by imposing the latter
at the listing phase, the Supreme Court failed to safeguard the interests
Congress intended to protect. The Court defeated the purpose of the
statute when it registered polluters’ interests as interests to be made a
cost to the public’s interest to health, despite Congress’ unambiguous
determination to the contrary. By establishing the general principle
that cost consideration is a requirement of administrative rationality,
73. Michigan, 135 S. Ct. at 2708 (emphasis added).
74. Id. at 2726 (Kagan, J. dissenting).
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without properly clarifying the meaning of the cost/rationality nexus,
Michigan invites agencies and the judiciary to second-guess statutory
cost determinations. This might have been avoided had the Court
considered the distinction between cost determination and cost
quantification. A coherent conception of this distinction would have
enabled the Court to clearly articulate the prescriptive meaning of the
cost/rationality nexus and that administrative action remained
consistent with the congressional definition of legitimate interests.
Ultimately, Michigan highlights the importance of properly
appreciating the juridical assumptions underpinning cost
consideration, and the relevance of these assumptions in the context of
rationality review of administrative action.

